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This paper examines how both opponents and 
proponents of the proposed high-level nuclear waste 
repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada claim that 
uncontroversial information supports their conflicting 
positions. Four pieces of information in particular are 
claimed by both sides: the distance of the proposed site 
from Las Vegas, the volume of waste that has been 
produced, the threat of terrorism since 9/11/01, and the 
occurrence of an earthquake in early 2002. Possible 
explanations for the difference include Naïve Positivism, 
Social Constructionism, Persistent Beliefs and Implicit 
Warrants. The latter two models better explain observed 
knowledge / preference states. If so, more or better 
information alone will not improve the dialog about 
Yucca Mountain. Rather, dialog should include a 
discussion of the ways in which they interpret information 
and draw conclusions based on their beliefs and 
warrants. This conclusion may be generalized to a range 
of information-intensive risk decisions 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1980’s Yucca Mountain in Nevada has 
been the single site under consideration as the future 
repository for civilian high-level radioactive waste. A 
variety of governmental, non-profit, individual and 
commercial stakeholders have engaged in intense and 
often inflammatory debate about the site selection process. 
Each side claims that existing technical information about 
the site supports its position. Each side claims that the 
other side is either ignorant about the information, or is 
disingenuous in its use of information.  
Both of these claims imply that technical information 
can determine whether or not to open Yucca Mountain to 
nuclear waste. For example both Al Gore and George W. 
Bush, in their 2000 campaign tours through Nevada, 
claimed that they would “let the science decide” about 
Yucca Mountain. Subsequently, the Bush administration 
has claimed [1] that the science supports his decision to go 
forward with the project, while opponents complain that he 
has reneged on his promise to rely on science. Greenspun 
[2], for examples, asserts Bush relies on bad information, 
and in light of recent scandals, “it can no longer be claimed 
by anyone that the science is sound.”  
Several possible conditions could explain why opposing 
sides of a contested issue argue that technical information 
supports their positions. One is that one side or the other is 
truly ignorant. This is the most commonly heard argument 
from the two sides in this debate [3],[4]. Another possible 
explanation is that of social constructionism, in which 
"truth" is seen as being constructed through discourse, and a 
discourse community's view of "truth" is influenced by both 
beliefs and evidence. In this case, there are two different 
discourse communities--those who favor Yucca Mountain 
and those opposed. The two differ in their beliefs, values, 
and languages; therefore, they have little common ground 
from which to engage in productive dialogue [5]. A final, 
largely neglected possibility is that the two sides agree on 
the information, are unaware of such agreement, and 
disagree on how to interpret information.  
This paper explores the final possibility. We argue that, 
so long as opposing sides wield agreed-upon information 
about Yucca Mountain to support their positions, debate 
about the technical merits of the site is unlikely to improve 
stakeholder dialog. We consider several possible models to 
explain disagreement: two versions of a “Naïve Positivist” 
model, a “Social Constructionist” model, a “Persistent 
Belief” model, and an “Implicit Warrants” model. We 
conclude that the Naïve Positivist model is held by 
individuals of both sides in the debate, but that neither is 
supported by observed combinations of knowledge and 
 
 preference. The Social Constructionist model does not 
explain the cases we review, since there is no claimed 
disagreement on the truth. Both the Persistent Belief and 
Implicit Warrants models better explain existing 
knowledge and preference. The Yucca Mountain decision 
process will be best served by addressing preferences and 
beliefs. Further analysis, even if undisputed, will continue 
to undermine the process. 
2. Three Models of Knowledge and 
Preference 
2.1. The Naïve Positivist Model(s) 
Shrader-Frechette [6] identifies nuclear power 
advocates as “Naïve Positivists,” in that they insist that 
technical information about nuclear power necessarily will 
favor nuclear power, and that ignorance about technical 
information best explains opposition. We consider this 
model in the context of the Yucca Mountain Project. 
Implied in this model (Table 1) is that informed 
individuals will only be found in the upper right quadrant, 
where knowledge intersects with support for opening 
Yucca Mountain. The uninformed could be found in either 
of the two left quadrants. Resolving the current conflict on 
Yucca Mountain, then, would be best effected though 
education, since learning would move people from the left 
to the upper right.  
Table 1.  Naïve Positivist Matrix: Advocates 
 Ignorant Knowledgeable 
For Possible Some 
Against Some No one 
 
The inverse (Table 2), not suggested by Shrader-
Frechette but certainly implicit among Yucca Mountain 
opponents, is a Naïve Positivist position against Yucca 
Mountain. Here, technical information answers the Yucca 
Mountain question in the negative: the best available 
information belies the credibility of the project. Again, 
education is the solution. The implication of this model is 
that only the lower of the two right-hand quadrants can be 
populated, and learning will move individuals from either 
quadrant on the left to the lower right quadrant.  
Table 2.  Naïve Positivist Matrix: Opponents 
 Ignorant Knowledgeable 
For Some No one 
Against Possible Some 
 
Either of the Naïve Positivist models would be 
validated by first determining whether there is general 
agreement about what constitutes information, observing 
whether informed individuals fall only in one of the two 
quadrants to the right, and evaluating whether learning 
moves individual from the left into the populated quadrant 
on the right.  
 
2.2. The Social Constructionist Model 
In the Social-Constructionist Model (Table 3), any of 
the four quadrants can be populated. Of key importance is 
that the source and nature of information in the upper right 
hand quadrant differs from that in the lower right hand 
quadrant. Learning could not shift individuals already on 
the right up or down, since the nature of that information 
will be dependent upon their preferences for or against 
Yucca Mountain. It would be possible (but unlikely) for 
people on the left to move up or down as they chose which 
information to accept, or if they accept either information or 
values from the other.  
Table 3.  Social Constructionist Matrix 
 Ignorant Knowledgeable 
For Some Some 
Against Some Some 
 
2.3. The Persistent Belief Model 
Baron [7] posits that people frequently use information 
uncritically to bolster their established beliefs. He observes 
“irrational persistence of beliefs” among individuals who 
hold on to beliefs in the face of information that they should 
accept and that should undermine their beliefs. We adopt 
his language to propose the “Persistent Belief” model 
(Table 4). If we apply this to the Yucca Mountain case, we 
assume that individuals have established preferences for or 
against Yucca Mountain. New information is not 
interpreted critically, but is automatically assumed to 
support existing positions. While everyone on the right is 
equally well informed, some or all of those individuals have 
not thought critically about the meaning of that information. 
Critical thinking could move individuals on the right up or 
down. 
Table 4.  Persistent Beliefs Matrix 
 Ignorant Knowledgeable 
For Some Some 
Against Some Some 
 
2.4. The Implicit Warrants Model  
The logical theory of Stephen Toulmin [8] suggests that 
individuals move from data, or available evidence, to 
conclusions by means of warrants, or general propositions 
that are not stated explicitly. Data answers the question, 
what have you got to go on?, while warrants answer the 
question, how did you get there?, or how did you draw a 
conclusion from a given piece of data? Warrants, as 
Toulmin explains, are field-dependent; that is, the context 
that surrounds an argument—i.e., its field—will determine 
the nature of the argument [9]. Different arguments can be 
 
 said to come from different fields if they rely on different 
warrants to reach their conclusions, even if they rely on the 
same evidence. In this case, individuals on the right will 
move up or down only if they use different warrants; that 
is, a different type of reasoning. Thus the final model we 
consider here is the “Implicit Warrants” model (Table 5). 
Table 5.  Implicit Warrants Matrix 
 Ignorant Knowledgeable 
For Some Some 
Against Some Some 
3. The “Facts” About Yucca Mountain 
Here we consider four well-established pieces of 
information about Yucca Mountain [10],[11].  
The total amount of waste that will be interred at 
Yucca Mountain 
The distance from Yucca Mountain to the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area 
The history of earthquakes near Yucca Mountain 
The heightened concern about terrorism since 
September 11, 2001 
Each of these four points has been used in arguments 
for and against the establishment of Yucca Mountain as 
the nation’s high-level civilian waste repository. We 
describe each case, and note how the information has been 
used by the two sides of the Yucca Mountain debate. 
By 2000, civilian reactors had generated about 25,000 
cubic yards of waste slated for Yucca Mountain. Wolfe 
[12] used this figure to argue in favor of the Yucca 
Mountain Project, while Flynn et al [13] felt is was a 
reason to hold off on the project. Interesting, both 
employed the same analogy, describing the waste in 
vertical feet covering a football field.  
Yucca Mountain is located about 90 miles northwest of 
Las Vegas, at the northern edge of the Nevada Test site. In 
2001, a number of students were interviewed session for 
the “Silver State 100,” a selection process to identify the 
top 100 high school seniors in Nevada 2001. To evaluate 
their critical thinking skills, they were asked to argue their 
position for or against the Yucca Mountain Project. 
Students arguing in opposition claimed that the site is 
unacceptably close to Las Vegas, while those who favored 
the site described it as in the middle of nowhere. One of 
the authors (Hassenzahl) participated in this selection 
process as an interviewer. The intent of the interviews was 
not to gather data on how students use information, so this 
is an observation, not formally recorded information. 
A number of earthquakes have been recorded over the 
past several decades within 20 miles of Yucca Mountain. 
In 2002, an earthquake was centered 12 miles from the 
site. This prompted two types of responses. A letter to the 
editor of the Las Vegas Review Journal argued that this 
should provide assurance, since no significant damage was 
recorded at the site [14]. In contrast, the State of Nevada 
official Yucca Mountain website identifies known 
earthquakes as definitive disqualifying data [15].  
Finally, since 2001, there has been increased concern 
about terrorist use of a “dirty bomb” or physical dispersal of 
high-level waste. Yucca Mountain Project advocates note 
that because wastes are currently stored on-site in populated 
parts of the country, it should be removed as soon as 
possible to avoid terrorist attack [16]. Opponents observe 
that waste will be transported through major metropolitan 
centers on its way to Yucca Mountain, a concern that they 
expect will eventually coalesce opposition around the 
country [17],[18]. 
4. Discussion: Explaining Preferences for / 
against Yucca Mountain 
Each of the examples above indicates that the two sides 
do appear to hold Naïve Positivist models. That is, both 
opponents and advocate of the Yucca Mountain Project 
claim that technical information supports their positions. 
This contrasts with Shrader-Frechette’s [6] Naïve Positivist 
model, in which only the YMP advocates hold Naïve 
Positivist positions. Since the two sides appear to know and 
agree on the information, neither version of the Naïve 
Positivist model explains the observed knowledge / 
preference matrix illustrated in Tables One through Five. 
Since identical information is claimed as support for both 
positions, neither side can learn the information and 
consequently change preferences.  
The Social Constructionist model also fails to explain 
the differences observed here. The two sides do not claim 
different knowledge in support of different positions. 
Rather, they agree on the information, but disagree on 
which preference set that information supports. What is 
missing, however, is the link between the information and 
the claim, which suggests that the Persistent Belief and 
Implicit Warrants models merit further consideration.  
Under the Persistent Belief model, individuals 
unthinkingly adopt new information to buttress their 
positions. This implies the possibility that carefully 
considered information could change the beliefs of one side 
(or both). For example, it seems unlikely that the amount of 
waste generated to date, as a stand-alone value, could 
obviously support either position. Yet both sides have 
explicitly made such claims. Likewise, it is possible that 
either current on-site storage or transportation could be 
universally accepted as the greater hazard; both sides have 
looked to the aspect of this issue that best supports their 
positions.  
In the Implicit Warrants model, individuals are using 
the same sets of evidence to come to different conclusions 
by using different warrants. Because data are generally 
explicitly stated, whereas warrants are generally appealed to 
implicitly, it is possible to take a particular piece of 
information such as “Yucca Mountain is 100 miles from 
Las Vegas,” and, by using the implicit warrant “it is likely 
that the repository will leak,” or “waste being hauled 
through Las Vegas is likely to spill” conclude that “Yucca 
Mountain will threaten the city of Las Vegas.” On the other 
hand, if one’s implicit warrant is “the science indicates that 
Yucca Mountain will contain the waste for 10,000 years,” 
 
 then the evidence that “Yucca Mountain is 100 miles from 
Las Vegas” leads to the conclusion that the city will be 
safe. According to Toulmin’s theory, the two sides are in 
fact existing in two separate argument fields. In this 
model, it is necessary for each side to make their warrants 
explicit—to explain the “backing” or credentials of the 
warrant—and accept that the other side uses different 
warrants in order for persuasion to occur, and for people to 
change their positions. 
5. Conclusions 
The Persistent Belief and Implicit Warrants models 
have received less attention in the literature than have the 
two Naïve Positivist models and the Social Constructionist 
model. Yet Persistent Beliefs, Implicit Warrants, or some 
hybrid of the two, best explains the conflict. The main 
strategy of Yucca Mountain advocates and opponents alike 
is to promote more and better information. We conclude 
that additional knowledge—without careful attention to its 
context and origins—cannot plausibly lead to consensus, 
and is likely to deepen disagreement.  
More fruitful, then, is to probe for existing beliefs and 
implicit warrants. Either advocates, opponents, or both 
may be undermining their own preferences by not 
considering alternatives. At the same time, both actively 
undermine useful debate by accusing their counterparts of 
ignorance and disingenuousness. While these two 
characteristics can surely be found on both sides, they 
probably are not as prevalent as often assumed. 
Unfortunately, it will be very difficult to convince either 
side to consider the possibility that they could change their 
minds. 
We do not argue that there is no contested information 
about Yucca Mountain. The recent scandal over USGS 
scientists possibly misrepresenting information about 
groundwater flow through the site demonstrates the 
complexities, tensions, and political nature of the science 
at issue. However, it is clear that disagreement about 
information is at best an incomplete explanation for the 
existing conflict. Our conclusions do suggest that 
consensus resolutions of informational disputes is unlikely 
to improve stakeholder dialog, since whatever the 
outcome, both sides will claim that their positions have 
been bolstered. 
Finally, we have provided cases, not an extensive 
analysis. We have found examples that suggest knowledge 
of individual facts, and the use of those facts to support 
either position on Yucca Mountain. It is not clear how 
knowledge / ignorance and preference are distributed 
among the four quadrants among individuals in the general 
population. Likewise, we cannot make claims about the 
extent to which people in general believe that the four 
items considered here support their preferences for or 
against the project. However, preliminary analysis of some 
recent data (Hassenzahl and Laidler, unpublished) suggests 
that all four quadrants are at a minimum populated, and 
that people do identify these four pieces of information as 
supporting their preferences. 
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